

A
P O L I T I C A L
C A T E C H I S M.

INTENDED TO CONVEY, IN A FAMILIAR
MANNER, JUST IDEAS OF GOOD CIVIL
GOVERNMENT, AND THE BRITISH
CONSTITUTION.

BY ROBERT ROBINSON,
OF CHESTERTON, NEAR CAMBRIDGE.


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L O N D O N;

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M D C C L X X X I I.

PRICE TWO SHILLINGS.



ADVERTISEMENT.

DURING the late administration, all, who had the virtue and courage to avow sound principles of civil government, were reproached with want of loyalty to the crown and respect for government, and the struggles of liberty were called by many an ignoble soul, inflammatory, republican and seditious. The nation was oppressed by principals, and insulted by their tools. The virtue of adversity is resolute firmness, the friends of freedom knew it, and gloriously persevered till they obtained the prize. To support the present excellent administration, to prevent the return of such distracted times, to disseminate safe political principles, to place publick happiness on its true base, PUBLICK POLITICAL VIRTUE, are duties of all good citizens, and we humbly hope it will not be accounted presumption

iv A D V E R T I S E M E N T.

presumption to endeavour to attract the attention of youth to this subject. This is the whole design of the following essay. It is not a system of government, it is intended only to engage the British youth to study the subject in books professedly written for the purpose.

May the present happy revolution be the everlasting death of toryism, and the joyful resurrection of honest men !

The reader will suppose a youth just returned from school at the holiday vacation, and going to salute his father with his written piece in his hand.

JUNE 4, 1782.

S A T U R D A Y.

George. **S**IR, I do myself the honour to present my piece to you.

Parent. I am always happy, George, to see you improve.—You have a list of long words here.

MYSTERIOUSNESS.

CONSTITUTION.

ADMINISTRATION.

REPRESENTATION.

TAXATION.

RESPONSIBILITY.

GENERALISSIMO.

AGGRANDIZEMENT.

EMIGRATION.

I hope your tutor has enabled you to understand the *subjects* intended by these words.

G. He has, sir, I wrote them myself, I can spell them, and I believe, I can turn each into Latin;

B

P. Softly,

P. Softly, my good boy, you say you can write, and spell, and translate—What? the *words*—but I inquired whether you understood the *subjects* intended to be expressed by these words. This is quite another thing. Words are pictures of ideas, and each word in your piece is a representation of a great number of ideas. You will forgive me, if I suspect you want a little tuition on these articles, especially when I add, I shall be proud to instruct you.

G. Thank you, sir. When shall I have the honour to wait on you?

P. Breakfast with me as many mornings as you have words in your piece. We will investigate one word, or rather one subject every morning, and by the end of the holidays you will be a politician.

G. Pardon me, sir, you have too much partiality for me. You was pleased to say a politician. Do these nine words contain a system of polity? How is it possible I should understand a system of government in ten days?

P. Indeed I do not speak the language of affection. I protest it is the cool voice of my reason. Government, as well as every other science, beheld in the gross, resembles a loaded fruit tree in autumn: but as all the fruits, and foliage, and ramifications of the one, so
all

all the departments of the other may be reduced to a few first principles, and these comprehended the whole is understood.

G. Then, Sir, in ten days I should be able to govern a kingdom.

P. No such thing. You must distinguish between theory and practice. These subjects are general principles, absolutely necessary to practice: but cases and circumstances occur in practice, which require present, personal genius and dexterity in the use and application of these principles. Can't you make this distinction?

G. I am trying, Sir.

P. Your brother James yesterday had a fit of the ague, and a fever followed.

G. He had, sir.

P. Dr. Hyde was sent for.

G. He was, sir.

P. You was with him. What did the Doctor do?

G. He staid half an hour, and spent all the time in obtaining a clear notion of my brother's then present condition.

P. And when he came down stairs he sat down, and wrote a prescription, which the servant carried to the apothecary.

G. He did.

P. Now

P. Now do you not see in all this exactly what I mean by principle and practice in a science, as for instance by principles of physick, and the practice of these principles in actual healing?

G. I think I do, sir. Before Dr. Hyde came he perfectly understood anatomy, or the structure of the human body. Is anatomy what you call a medical principle, sir?

P. Certainly.

G. And is not the knowledge of drugs another principle, sir?

P. It is. Drugs, and whatever else can be applied in the art of healing, physicians call the *materia medica*. Knowledge of solids and fluids, in short the construction of the human body—knowledge of minerals, vegetables, and so on in the *materia medica*, these in physick are general principles. Would you trust a physician, who was ignorant of these medical principles?

G. I believe if I were weak enough to do so once, he would put it out of my power to offend a second time against the first law of nature, self preservation.

P. His general principles, however, you see must be directed by a wise attention to little circumstances of air, diet, exercise, and so on, which must determine the time, and
the

the place, and the quantity of his applications. Dr. Hyde visited James to collect these circumstances, and then by prescribing reduced his principles to practice.

G. I see it clearly.

P. Now transfer these remarks to polity. Consider the constitution of a kingdom as you consider anatomy—and administration, taxation, and so on as you consider the materia medica, and you easily see a man ought not to be trusted to govern who is ignorant of sound principles of studied and approved polity.

G. I allow it, and I admit also that government, or the actual application of these principles of polity require personal qualifications, and attention to circumstances.

P. Suppose your physician a drunkard?

G. I should expect to be poisoned.

P. Suppose him a spendthrift or a miser?

G. I should suspect he would derange my affairs to arrange his own.

P. Suppose him a profligate, unprincipled infidel?

G. I would rather let my disease take its course, and say God's will be done, than hire a wretch to bully me into the grave.

P. Do you say the same of a political governor?

G. I must think a little.

P. O!

P. O! fine fellow! persist in that, and you will make a man. Think! why the whole world might be wise, if they would but think.—But half mankind don't think. The human soul is a fine vessel, George, but it rots in harbour for want of freight.—Well, sir, have you thought.

G. I think till I blush, and yet I have a difficulty which I can't get over. I blush to think how defective my benevolence is. I don't know whether I have any. I would not trust my own life in the hand of one vicious or unprincipled physician: yet I seem inclined to commit the lives of an army, and a navy, and a whole nation to an ignorant libertine. I am induced to do so by recollecting that some wicked men have been good governors.

P. So it is frequently said: but I doubt this. However, I think the question quite needless. If indeed there were no good men in a kingdom, we might be driven to the sad necessity of comforting ourselves with thinking that vicious characters might do: but all kingdoms have men of political virtue, and there is no need to employ the worthless while the worthy lie idle.

G. Pray, sir, what do you call political virtue?

P. You

P. You know every man is naturally obliged to perform some services to God—others to himself—and a third class to his neighbours.

G. I know it—and I think I know some, who are so intent on discharging one class of these obligations as to forget the other two.

P. Suppose a political governor to neglect divine worship, and to injure his own health by intemperance?

G. I should say he left two parts of three of his duty undone.

P. But suppose him to have just notions of government, and to discharge well a publick trust, would you say he left the other third part of duty undone?

G. By no means.

P. Would not you call this political virtue?

G. I know not what else to call it.

P. Would not you feel more esteem for him, and place more confidence in him, if he were an uniform character, discharging all other duties as well as this?

G. I should.

P. Is not confidence in political governors one branch of the peoples political virtue?

G. I think it is.

P. What! Is it a virtue to confide in men known to betray their trust?

G. No, certainly.

P. You

P. You say people ought to confide in their governors?

G. I said so unwarily. I mean, or ought to mean the political wisdom and virtue of their governors.

P. It is not the person of the governor then that is the object of the people's trust: but his qualifications.

G. I mean so.

P. There is then an object of confidence, a ground of reliance, a reason in a man why I should trust him, is there?

G. Undoubtedly.

P. What is it? skill? or integrity? or both?

G. If I know a man to be wise I can trust his judgment, but I cannot trust his conduct, unless I know him to be upright.

P. So you make integrity essentially necessary to a good political ruler!


G. I do. How else can the people trust him?

P. Yet you said just now a wicked man might be a good governor? How is this?

G. I see how it is. A man wicked in some respects may not be wicked in every case, and where he is virtuous he may be trusted: as for instance, if he understand government, and
faithfully

faithfully discharge publick trusts, then I may trust him politically; if he understand physick, and have the integrity necessary to his profession, I may trust him medically: but in other cases, which he does not understand or practise, there he ceases to be an object of confidence. Am I right, sir?

P. Entirely. I shall expect you on Monday morning. Farewell.



MYSTERIOUSNESS.

M O N D A Y.

MYSTERIOUSNESS.

Parent. **W**ELL, George, what says Dr. Johnson about mysteriousness?

George. I confess, sir, I have been looking, and he tells me, it sometimes signifies holy obscurity, and sometimes artful perplexity.

P. I wish authors have not made a distinction without a difference.

G. You think, sir, if holiness be obscure, it is because art has perplexed it?

P. Indeed I do.

G. Is not mysteriousness spun out of mystery, sir?

P. It is. Mystery is a fine material for manufacture. But, to come to the point, what is the plain English of mystery?

G. A mystery is a secret, I think. I can make no more of it.

P. Is

P. Is not every thing, that you do not understand, a secret to you?

G. Certainly.

P. Are there not some secrets, which you do not choose to understand?

G. A great many, I suppose.

P. For example, you would not choose to understand by experience the horror of a guilty conscience after the commission of a great crime?

G. God forbid!

P. You would not stoop to understand how to cut out a piece of check for sailors shirts so as to make it yield the greatest profit to the sloopfeller?

G. I would not, unless I were a sloopfeller.

P. Observe, at this window, a dispute now agitating in the shrubbery between the gardener and his boy. You would not choose to investigate the cause of his shaking the hoe at the boy?

G. It's not worth my attention.

P. There are, then, some mysteries so painful, and others so insignificant, that you beg leave to have no acquaintance with them?

G. Certainly.

P. And you do not think the worse of yourself for your ignorance?

G. Quite

G. Quite the contrary. I prize my condition the more, because it does not expose me to the necessity of acquiring such low information at a price so dear.

P. Are there no secrets worth knowing?

G. A great many no doubt. Why else are young gentlemen educated, why are some put apprentices, or articulated clerks?

P. Is there any one of these a mystery in its own nature, or are they all mysterious by accident?

G. Pardon me, sir, I am not master of the question.

P. Let us take it to pieces. Is there not a mystery in ship-building?

G. To me there is.

P. And in navigating a vessel to the East or West Indies?

G. To me undoubtedly, for I have neither received tuition, nor employed my time about these subjects. I have neither served a shipwright, nor been a voyage.

P. This is what I mean. If these subjects be unknown to you, it is not because they are in themselves inexplicable and unattainable, for this would be a mystery in the nature of the subjects, and then nobody could understand them: but it is because you have not
turned

turned your attention to them, and this I call mystery by accident.

G. Am I then to suppose myself capable of understanding every thing?

P. Is your eye capable of seeing every thing?

G. Every visible thing.

P. Is every sense of your body capable of receiving all sorts of impressions belonging to each sense?

G. It is with each sense as it is with my hearing. The same ear, that hears you speak, can hear all sorts of sounds from the roar of thunder down to the softest breeze.

P. Apply this to our subject. Every branch of knowledge is referable to some power of the mind, poetry to fancy, languages to memory, and so on: now if you have the mental power proper to one subject, you have the power, or ability, or capacity, call it what you please to attain all subjects belonging to that power.

G. Do I understand you, sir? The same memory, that retains greek, would retain hebrew, arabick, welch, and all other languages, had I inclination, time and tuition to pursue them?

P. Just so.

G. I perceive then, there are many secrets worth knowing: but which I have no inclination

nation to know, because my life is short; and I have no immediate business with them.

P. In your choice of knowledge, then, you would select important articles, would you?

G. What opinion would you form of my prudence, Sir, if I did not?

P. An opinion not much to your honour, George. But give me leave to put your skill to proof, by requiring you to inform me what art you think the most deserving of a young gentleman's attention?

G. I have heard my uncle say, the art of governing, Sir.

P. And do you think so?

G. I should think so, if people at my humble distance might presume to smatter a little about a science so profound.

P. Good George, where did you learn this unmanly style? I fear you keep bad company. You talk the language of broken spirited slaves living under arbitrary governors, where the people are nursed to think themselves beasts, and their tyrants almighty gods. This is smuggled, this is not British, George.

G. Pardon me, Sir, I speak as I think.

P. Pray what humble distance is that you talk of? The distance between the governors and the governed in a free nation is exactly the same as that between lessee and lessor.

D

G. I

G. I own I have understood, Sir, that there is, in all kingdoms impliedly, and in our kingdom expressly, a mutual compact between prince and people.

P. Very well. Where is the immense distance then?

G. Is not government a profound mystery, Sir?

P. You said there was a compact between prince and people?

G. I did.

P. What is a compact?

G. An agreement, a contract. *a*

P. When two or more persons make an agreement, do not both parties thoroughly understand the terms?

G. If either did not it would be accounted fraudulent.

P. Suppose a company, the East-India company for example, to contract for so many ton of shipping, ought not both the company and the contractor to bargain in clear explicit terms intelligible to both parties?

G. Undoubtedly.

P. Suppose it does not suit all the company to take a personal concern in making the contract?

G. They would employ some few of themselves a committee to transact the business.

P. Whence

P. Whence do this committee derive ability to make this contract ?

G. From their own personal qualifications. They are to be supposed men conversant in this sort of business.

P. Who is to judge of their ability ?

G. The company that employ them.

P. And whence do they derive power to exercise this ability in the name, and for the benefit of the whole company ?

G. From the appointment of the whole company.

P. Is the company then at a humble distance from the contracting parties ?

G. The company are their employers, I perceive.

P. Do not the company retain a right of judging whether these parties discharge their trusts ?

G. Assuredly.

P. Is there any mystery in all this ?

G. If I choose not to concern myself about it there is. Not otherwise.

P. You think you could obtain the knowledge of ship-timber, naval stores, prices of workmanship, and so on, if you applied yourself to these subjects ?

G. I am sure I could, because the men, who do understand them, have no more bodily senses,

senses, no more mental faculties than I have, and the only advantage they have over me is application.

P. Now you talk English again, and you will speak good English if you apply these observations to that profound science, I say that profound science George, of government. Dare you, good humble soul, at your humble distance, presume to smatter in this subject?

G. If it be presumption, Sir, you inspire me to presume to answer any question you think proper to ask.

P. What is it to govern?

G. To rule, to regulate.

P. What is the government of a kingdom?

G. The regulation of it.

P. Ought any man to regulate my affairs without my consent?

G. Certainly not.

P. You think, no man ought to regulate my time, my diet, my dress, my money, my trade, or any thing else of mine without my consent?

G. No man ought to attempt it.

P. If I have not time to attend to all my affairs, would it not be wise in me to employ somebody to transact them for me?

G. It would.

P. Should

P. Should I be wise to commit my affairs to a novice or a knave?

G. That no man would willingly do.

P. But how am I to know whether a man be wise and upright?

G. Nothing seems easier, Sir. There is no mystery in this, I am sure.

P. You think, I suppose, that a good tree brings forth good fruit?

G. All the world think so.

P. Suppose, for I am not infallible, and many men walk in masquerade, suppose I should find on trial that I am deceived in my man?

G. Discharge him, and employ another.

P. Thus far, then, there is no mystery. But may I apply these observations to the government of the affairs of a kingdom?

G. It should seem so.

P. You say to govern a kingdom is to regulate the affairs of it?

G. I do,

P. You say, the affairs of this kingdom are regulated according to compact?

G. Expressly so—a contract confirmed by oath.

P. You say, this compact ought to be, and actually is perfectly understood by both the contracting parties?

G. I

G. I do.

P. Do you see any mystery in all this?

G. There is none, and yet somehow or other I cannot get rid of the idea of *arcana imperii*, impenetrable depth in governors, which it is presumption in the governed to censure, to fear, or to suspect.

P. You should have lived in the reign of Q. Elizabeth, or in that of James I. But the idea is an excrescence. Are you willing to get rid of it?

G. Do me the honour to try, Sir.

P. Courage then! What is the usual cause of perplexity of ideas?

G. I am not prepared to answer.

P. Is a perplexed idea one idea only, or is it many ideas crowded into one? For example, have you a clear idea of a single tree, an oak, suppose?

G. I have.

P. Have you an idea as clear of one wilderness of trees, made up of oaks, elms, chestnuts, dwarfs, evergreens, and so on?

G. My idea of a wilderness is complex, and composed of ideas of many different trees, and consequently in some degree perplexed, and it would be in a great degree perplexed if there were many trees in the wilderness, with which I was not acquainted.

P. If

P. If I were then to describe this wilderness by affirming it consisted of trees always green, and tall, should not I perplex the subject more?

G. Certainly. Oaks are not evergreens, nor are dwarfs tall.

P. How must I make the description plain?

G. By separating my general idea of a wilderness into many ideas of single trees growing together, and ascribing to each tree its own properties.

P. A general tree then is a creature of art?

G. It is, and I suspect no creature in nature can define it.

P. Apply this to our subject, and you will instantly perceive how your notion of a ruler became perplexed.

G. I see it plainly. You was speaking of a British government, and a British king, and I have been thinking of king in general. Mine was an abstract idea, or rather, a name without any precise idea at all.

P. This was the cause of your perplexity. A tyrant, who has subdued a nation into slavery, and silence, and horror, is deep and impenetrable, and he is so for the same reason a murderer is so, a declaration of the use he intended to make of his ability and power would defeat his design: but all this has nothing to do

do with the case of a prince, who accepts a crown on conditions, openly avowed, publicly investigated, and thoroughly understood by the whole world.

G. I perceive it, and I recollect, too, that you distinguished principles of polity, clearly and fully known, from application of these in actual government, which may require secrecy and dispatch.

P. By the way, George, I can't help lamenting the course of education, and the choice of books in fashion in the schools. What do you think of Cæsar and Alexander and such heroes of antiquity?

G. I think they were butchers of mankind.

P. What can you think of men, who ascribe to such detestable tyrants the qualifications of good governors?

G. I think they are grossly ignorant, or extremely wicked. Their politicks are not fit for us.

P. These are the MAGNI, the GREAT, you know!

G. A tiger is greater than a cat, and my fear of each bears a just proportion to its size.

P. Under the tyranny of such rulers mystery is inculcated. The peoples spirits must be tamed. They must be trained up in implicit faith.

faith. The infinite ability necessary to regulate affairs—the utter incapacity of the people to judge of a science so profound as government—These are topics I would have you leave the hirelings of a despot to varnish. If the emperor of China had understood popery he would not have banished the Jesuit Missionaries.

G. Perhaps he had a mind to play Jupiter solus?

P. Perhaps so.

G. I think I love my country the better, Sir, for your conversation. I feel a little more self-importance, and I look up to my prince with more reverence, for this sort of government considers us as two open, ingenuous, sensible, honest men. The other dark system supposes fraud and fear, it makes a prince a knave, and a nation a fool, consequently it is disgraceful to both, yea, worse, it is dangerous to both, it generates suspicion and cruelty, by destroying mutual confidence, the only worthy bond of political union.

P. True.—Did I not prophesy you would be a politician? Remember to morrow—and take one short lesson for this day—dare to think for yourself—If you must perish, ruin yourself, and don't let other men ruin you by inculcating credulity and diffidence. — The physician will tell you he knows your consti-

E

tution

tution better than you do—the lawyer will pretend you do not understand law, and he must manage your property—the priest will fettle your accounts with God—the draper will choose your cloth—and the taylor your fashion—and if you can but find money and implicit faith, back and legs to bear the burden, you may have the honour of ambling through the world, and carrying out of the dirt single, double, or treble, as many cunning men as choose to ride you. When a Jewish prince of this character died, he was buried with the burial of an ass.

CONSTITUTION.

COMPTON

TUESDAY.

CONSTITUTION.

George. **O**UR subject to day, Sir, is Constitution, the *British* constitution I suppose.

Parent. You have profited by yesterday's conversation, and are going to set out right by defining your terms, and by precisely settling what we are to talk about?

G. If I were going to travel eastward, and were to set the first step westward, every succeeding step in the same line would place me at a greater distance from my journey's end.

P. True.—You have been thinking about the British constitution I perceive?

G. I have, but thinking seems dangerous to self-sufficiency, for I always find I know less of a subject when I aim at precision, than I fancied I did.

P. What difficulty have you met with?

G. I have dipped into Judge Blackstone's commentaries, and I find in one place he calls king, lords, and commons *the British constitution*, and in another he says members of parliament are *guardians* of the constitution.

P. Distinguish between *government* and *governors*,

vernors, and you will perceive both his expressions are right.

G. How Sir!

P. Don't you perceive a difference between a rule of action, and a ruler who enforces the rule; between regulation and regulator, government and governor?

G. I do. But I do not immediately comprehend the application.

P. Patience! What is it to constitute?

G. To make any thing what it is.

P. And what is constitution?

G. It is the act of making any thing what it is.

P. And what is the British constitution?

G. I fear I am aground.—Why, British constitution is that in Britain, which is what it is.

P. Is it not necessary to determine what thing you are inquiring into the constitution, or make of?

G. Pardon me, Sir, it may be necessary for you: but nobody can necessitate me to perform an impossibility. I protest I don't know what I am talking of.

P. You are talking of the British constitution, you say, constitution is the act of making something what it is, and I ask what this something is.

G. And I declare I do not know.

P. Suppose we try the word law, understanding by it rule of action, regulation of rights,
or

or civil government? And suppose I were to affirm, that the municipal law of Great Britain is constituted; or made up of just and virtuous political principles, principles conformable to those of the eternal immutable and infallible law of nature? Would that elucidate the subject?

G. I should then perfectly comprehend how king, lords, and commons were guardians of the constitution, for it would mean, that they were the expositors, superintendants, protectors, and administrators of the law of nature, that is, the just rights of mankind.

P. The question, then, is, what are the NATURAL RIGHTS of mankind, for the preservation of which British law is constituted, or made up?

G. Certainly mankind have natural rights.

P. When an infant is born, has any man a right to kill him?

G. It would be murder. He has a right to life.

P. As the child grows up has he a right to the free use of his eyes, hands, and legs, all the senses of his body, and all the powers of his mind?

G. He has a right to liberty, and it would be wrong either to imprison his body or to shackle his mind.

P. If he apply himself to labour, or to traffick, has he a right to enjoy and dispose of the profits of his own industry?

G. His

G. His property is truly his own. It is right he should enjoy it without fear.

P. If any man should deprive him of any of his rights by fraud or force, ought not justice to be done in his behalf?

G. Surely.

P. Man, then you allow, has a right to exercise and enjoy his own life, limbs, health, reputation, liberty, property, and conscience, and it is just to protect him in the enjoyment of his rights: or, to be more concise, every man has a natural right to personal security, personal liberty, and private property.

G. I allow the whole.

P. When you speak of the English constitution, then, you mean, that the law or the rule of civil conduct prescribed by the supreme power to all the inhabitants of this kingdom is made up of these just first principles?

G. I do.

P. And you look upon this to be civil government?

G. Yes.

P. And you consider governors, or the supreme power in this kingdom as guardians of this constitution, or body of right?

G. I do.

P. What does a member of parliament call his electors?

G. His constituents.

P. What is a constituent?

G. One

G. One who constitutes, or appoints another to be his deputy.

P. Do the electors of Great Britain appoint, or constitute the rights of mankind?

G. No surely. The rights of mankind are natural, and prior to all appointments.

P. Why then do you pretend to be constituents?

G. We are constituents, because we constitute or appoint deputies to administer our rights.

P. You see then there is a constitution of right independent of your appointment, and there is a constitution of persons to administer that right.

G. This last, I suppose, is what is usually intended, when we say the British constitution consists of king, lords and commons.

P. I suppose so.

G. I have understood, that the laws of society require us to give up some of our natural rights to publick convenience.

P. It must be so. You said, man had a natural right to use his limbs and senses and mental powers?

G. Yes.

P. But man living in company can have no right to abuse his genius to defraud another man, or his hands to strike him.

G. Certainly. He would be guilty of a wrong by depriving another of a right.

F

P. What

P. What then are the private rights of men in society?

G. I have understood, they are either that residuum of natural liberty, which is not required to be given up, or they are civil privileges, which society engages to provide in lieu of the natural liberties given up by individuals.

P. So the British civil constitution is nothing but a declaration of the natural rights of mankind?

G. So I think. Pray, Sir, how old is this declaration of rights?

P. It is of the most remote antiquity, and at least coeval with our form of government. Even in the time of Alfred, above nine hundred years ago, the maxims of common law were called *folcrighte*, folkright, or rights of the people.

G. Have these rights been perpetually allowed?

P. Far from it, they have often been invaded. Sometimes one order of men and sometimes another have violated these rights: but the violation being unnatural and repugnant to the constitution, has always produced convulsions in the state, and when the convulsion has been over the constitution has revived again.

G. These rights then are prior to magna charta?

P. Magna charta is a declaration of ancient rights,

rights, and you will find at different periods of our history, near forty declarations of rights, as the *petition of right* in the reign of Charles I. The *babeas corpus* act in the reign of Charles II. The *bill of rights* at the accession of William and Mary, and the *act of settlement*, limiting the crown to the present royal family. All these are declaratory of the true, ancient, and indubitable rights of the people of this kingdom, the last statute expressly declaring that LIBERTY BY LAW IS THE BIRTHRIGHT OF THE PEOPLE OF ENGLAND.

G. According to this doctrine, the people of England constitute, as was said before, a *form* of government for the preservation of these rights?

P. You said they were constituents, and the form of government, which they have constituted is that, which they judge the best, a mixt monarchy. Do you think it the best?

G. It should seem so.

P. How many forms of government are there in the world?

G. Political writers say, only three.

P. What is a democracy, one of the three?

G. A democracy is that form of government, which lodges sovereign power in an aggregate assembly, consisting of all the members of a community.

P. What is an aristocracy?

G. An aristocracy lodges sovereign power in a council composed of select members.

P. And what is a monarchy?

G. In a monarchy sovereign power is lodged in a single person.

P. What requisites ought to be found in a well constituted form of government?

G. Political writers say three—*wisdom*, to discern the real interest of the community—*goodness*, to endeavour always to pursue that real interest—and *power*, to carry this knowledge and intention into action.

P. And are these three requisites found in your constitution, which is mixt or made up of the three forms.

G. They are not only found there, but they are found there in union, which union is the excellence of our constitution, and gives it its singular beauty and superiority over the three.

P. What are the properties of the three forms of government you mentioned?

G. They say a democracy excels in virtue—an aristocracy in wisdom—and a monarchy in power.

P. What are the imperfections of the three?

G. Monarchs are more remarkable for extending and abusing power than for either wisdom or virtue. It is not the imperfection of the man: but of the condition he is in.

P. You

P. You may depend upon monarchy, then, for *power*.

G. Yes, but not for the use of it.

P. What is the imperfection of aristocracy?

G. You may depend upon a select council for *wisdom*: but not for virtue and power.

P. And what is the imperfection of a democracy?

G. You may depend on a democracy for political *virtue*, for they keep a jealous eye on the rights and liberties of mankind at large: but for wisdom to invent means, and for power to carry their good designs into execution, they must not be depended on. It is not the fault of individuals, it is the imperfection of the condition they are in.

P. So, by uniting the three you correct the imperfections of each, and produce a perfect form of government, a perfect constitution.

G. Pardon me, Sir, I do not say so.

P. Why what can disconcert your constitution?

G. Perhaps it is not so perfect in its kind as it might be: but, if it were, it is human, and therefore liable to wear away, if you will pardon the expression, I can conceive a thousand events, that might damnify this most excellent frame of government.

P. Name one.

G. Suppose the splendour and power of the monarch

monarch should blind the wisdom, and bribe away the virtue of the other two branches of the legislature?

P. The two would then become subservient to one, and in effect your constitution would be destroyed.

G. The effect would be destroyed I allow; but the name might remain.

P. So much the worse the damage would not be so soon perceived. Suppose such an event to happen, what ought you to do?

G. I should think it my duty as a good citizen, to try to arouse the attention of my fellow citizens to the danger, and in my little sphere I would endeavour to abate the malignant influence.

P. It would seem then you only value the form of your government for the sake of government itself?

G. It ought to be so.

P. Recapitulate the subject.

G. British civil constitution is a phrase, strictly speaking, expressive first of a natural constitution of rights native and inherent in all the inhabitants of this kingdom and in all mankind—next of a body of laws, peculiar to this kingdom, declaratory of these natural rights—and lastly, of a form of making and executing these laws by king, lords, and commons, the safety and excellence of which consists in each constituent part retaining its own nature, and place.

P. Have you not observed two or three vulgar errors in general conversation concerning the British constitution?

G. I am not aware of them at present.

P. You have heard people talk in the highest strains of our excellent constitution, our perfect constitution.

G. I have.

P. Ought we not to distinguish between absolute and comparative perfection. The British constitution has a comparative perfection, for compared with other governments it is the best: but as some things are incorporated in it, which are not congenial to its nature, it has not absolute perfection, for it is capable of improvement. I could mention a few instances.

G. I believe so.

P. Have you not also heard people talk at large about the framing of our constitution, as if all our ancestors met in one large plain at one time, and all cool, deliberate and disinterested, formed the present system of government? Others again talk as if all our immunities proceeded from the condescension and benevolence of our princes. Both sorts discover gross ignorance. Our constitution, like our language, is a fineness produced by the friction of contending interests, and we ought to ascribe the delicacy and elegance of it to providence working by time, and a course of events.

G. So.

G. So I think indeed.

P. Have not you seen enthusiasts to the wisdom of our ancestors? The wisdom of our ancestors renounced paganism: but it was their folly, that established popery. The wisdom of our ancestors built houses: but it was the folly of the lords of castles, that made dens and dungeons in them. The wisdom of our ancestors induced them to travel: but it was the wisdom of the moderns, that made good roads.

G. We are then to suppose that our ancestors, like other peoples ancestors, had some wisdom, and some folly, or some weakness, that could not give their wisdom effect.

P. You say right. It would not be fair in our successors to judge of our political wisdom by our actions, for we know many good things which we have no power to bring to pass: but which future and happier ages will congratulate themselves for discovering, only because they can reduce their knowledge to practice.

G. I heard a gentleman say, one day, that he considered the whole duration of the world as seventy, the usual duration of the life of man.

P. And what age did he say the world had now attained?

G. About sixteen.

P. I hardly think so much, for, like little boys, we have not left off fighting yet. However, it will soon be over with us, let us live happy while we are in it.

ADMI-

ADMINISTRATION.

W E D N E S D A Y.

A D M I N I S T R A T I O N.

P. **H**ITHERTO, George, we have endeavoured to select our words, and to affix precise ideas to them, that we might know what we were talking about. Will you not smile when I tell you, to day we are going to speak of one thing under a term that stands for another? We are going to examine the king's prerogative, and we examine it under the word Administration, which means the substitutes of the king, or, more strictly, the under servants of the people.

G. I shall suspend my observation, Sir, till you explain yourself.

P. I think it necessary, even in a rude sketch of our government, to examine the prerogatives of that one royal person, with whom the wisdom and virtue of our constitution have lodged that immense trust, the sole executive

power. And I think it constitutional to examine these in the light of Administration, because, by a supposition of law, for the prudent prevention of many inconveniences, and for the actual production of many noble effects, the king, in his political capacity, is always supposed a perfect being, who can do no wrong, and his ministers are supposed to advise and be answerable for every act of royalty, subject to remonstrance and complaint.

G. I see the reason of all this; and I suppose you will enlarge on this under the article of *Responsibility*.

P. I intend to do so. At present let us confine ourselves to prerogative.

G. What is prerogative in general, Sir?

P. Pre-eminence, and regal prerogative in particular, is the pre-eminence of the king over and above all other persons.

G. Wherein does it consist?

P. Constitutionally in *three* articles, *dignity*, *power* and *revenue*; to which I add a fourth, greater than all the three, which comes to pass eventually, and that is *influence*.

G. What is royal *dignity*, Sir, which you call the first prerogative?

P. It is the possession of certain attributes or perfections, essential to that respect, which ought

ought to be paid to the supreme executive power. More explicitly, the law ascribes to the king *sovereignty*, *perfection* of action and thought—*immortality* and *ubiquity*.

G. It is impossible the most exalted of human beings should possess these attributes.

P. All the world allow this: but these are suppositions of law, and are incorporated into our constitution for several noble purposes, all beneficial to society.

G. This is then the dignity, or the majesty of our kings. What is the second prerogative, *power*?

P. This, strictly speaking, is the executive part of our constitution, and it consists in a great variety of exertions, of which a slight arrangement will enable you to form some idea. You know this kingdom hath some connections with other states.

G. And I suppose the king has the power of receiving and sending ambassadors, residents, and consuls?

P. He has.

G. Has his majesty also the power of making treaties, leagues, and alliances?

P. He has, both with princes and states.

G. May he also make war and peace?

P. Both; and in these are included the power
of

of granting letters of marque to individuals to distress the enemy, and of safe-conducts and passports.

G. This is a great trust.

P. A greater than it may at first appear; but it is executed by ministers of state. Let us go on to domestick affairs.

G. That is to exertions of power at home. What are they, Sir?

P. The king, you know, is one constituent part of legislative power.

G. Yes.

P. He has the prerogative of convoking, adjourning, proroguing, and dissolving parliament; and if the two houses sit and make provisions, he may reject them, and refuse passing them into laws.

G. Is not the king also the power that moves the national military arms?

P. His majesty is generalissimo, he has the sole power of raising and regulating fleets and armies, of officering the militia, of erecting, manning, and governing forts, of appointing ports and havens, wharfs and quays, of building beacons, light-houses, and sea-marks, and of prohibiting the exportation of arms and ammunition.

G. An immense multitude of people must be employed to administer this branch of the royal prerogative.

P. An

P. An immense multitude is employed, and the whole business is an amazing system of boards, courts, officers, clerks and arrangements, under the direction of a few principal persons appointed by the crown for the purpose, as secretaries, admirals, generals, governors, paymasters, and so on.

G. To this power must be added, I suppose, another, that is, the power of administering justice?

P. Yes; the king is entrusted by the constitution with the conservation of the peace of the kingdom, and his majesty does this by erecting courts of judicature, and by appointing both supreme and subordinate officers and magistrates, as the Lord Chancellor, the Judges, the Sheriffs, the Justices of the Peace, under each of which are innumerable officers of inferior jurisdiction, from the Court of Chancery down to the bailiff, the jailor and the publick executioner.

G. The prerogative of royal proclamation belongs to this article, does it not, Sir?

P. It does; the constitution gives the king power to issue proclamations, on condition they be according to law.

G. Very well.

P. The next article of prerogative, is that of conferring honour, office and privilege.

G. His

G. His majesty confers all degrees of nobility and knighthood, I know.

P. He also erects and disposes of offices, for they are honours; and he can create new offices and new titles, though he cannot annex any fees to them. He can confer privileges on individuals, and erect corporations.

G. This trust supposes, to the honour of the prince, that he is the best, yea, the sole judge of merit.

P. Another royal prerogative is, the direction of commerce, and to this belongs the regulation of markets and fairs, with their tolls, weights, measures, monies, coinage, and so forth.

G. An ample trust, this!

P. Nothing to the next, which is the royal prerogative of being the only supreme head on earth of the church of England.

G. The king administers this prerogative by the clergy.

P. By this prerogative the king convenes, prorogues, and dissolves all ecclesiastical synods and convocations; nominates archbishops, bishops, deans, and other ecclesiastical dignitaries, under whom are innumerable courts, officers, and administrators, for the purpose of christening, marrying, burying, performing publick

publick worship, ordaining candidates for the ministry, proving wills, collecting tithes, and so on. A mixture of civil and sacred things.

G. From some one or other of these prerogatives, I should suppose his majesty the head of all literary bodies, as royal schools, colleges, and universities; of most publick charities, as many are royal foundations, and many more are incorporated; of all trading companies, and even of races, theatres, and publick amusements.

P. Directly or indirectly it is so.

G. The next prerogative you said was *revenue*.

P. The king's revenue is usually divided into ordinary and extraordinary. The ordinary revenue of the crown is small and inadequate to the support of the royal dignity. Formerly it consisted of the custody of the temporalities of bishops during the vacancy of the see, and some other ecclesiastical claims, which are now disused; demesne lands, forest-rights, fines, wrecks, profits of mines, treasure-trove, waifs, estrays, confiscated estates, forfeitures, escheats of lands, custody of idiots, and many more of the same antique cast, formerly of great value, and consequently occasions of intolerable and vexatious oppressions. Almost all these have

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been

been alienated from the crown, the remainder yield very little, and the deficiency is now amply supplied by what is called the extraordinary revenue.

G. The modern revenue, then, is in lieu of ancient prerogatives?

P. It is intended to be so. The first branch is the annual *land-tax*. Upon an average, this is said to be about three shillings and three-pence in the pound a year. This is assessed and raised by commissioners and their officers.

Next is an annual *malt-tax*, properly an annual excise on malt, cyder, and perry.

Customs or duties, payable upon merchandise exported and imported, make a third branch of prodigious magnitude, and create a great multitude of officers, as commissioners, collectors, receivers, surveyors, inspectors, examiners, clerks, tide-men, and so on.

Next is an inland revenue, called *excise* duty, a tax imposed on commodities of daily home consumption and use, malt, beer, spirits, candles, soap, coaches, plate, hides, glass, coffee, tea, paper, pasteboard, vinegar, and an endless number of other articles. The excise is managed by a great number of commissioners, collectors, secretaries, accountants, surveyors, auditors, clerks, supervisors, and officers.

The

The fifth branch of revenue is the *post office*, or duty for the carriage of letters. This also employs a great number of officers from the post-masters general down to the bell-men, who collect, the post-men, who deliver letters, and the boys, who carry the mails.

A sixth branch is *salt-duties*, a sort of excise, but managed by different commissioners, who have a number of officers under them.

A seventh branch of revenue is *stamp-duties*. This is a tax upon almost all parchments and papers, on which any legal proceedings are written, upon licenses for retailing wines, upon almanacks, news-papers, advertisements, cards and dice. This is a branch of amazing magnitude, and employs commissioners, receivers, inspectors, stampers, engravers, clerks, and so forth.

The eighth branch is a duty upon *houses* and *windows*, and employs, as all the other duties do, a great train of officers.

The ninth branch of revenue is a duty upon *licenses* to hackney coaches and chairs in and about London. This also is managed by commissioners and other officers.

The tenth is a duty of one shilling in the pound upon *offices* and pensions, salaries, fees and perquisites payable to the crown. Have I not tired your attention?

H 2

G. That

G. That would ill become me. Give me leave to say, Sir, enormous as this list appears, I recollect several articles you have thought proper to omit. There is a revenue arising from a tax upon *servants*, another from a tax upon *post-horses*.

P. I have purposely omitted several, for, recollect, I am speaking to you not of taxation but of royal prerogative, and administration of executive power; and I only mean to give you a brief sketch of a boundless subject, the particulars of which actually fill thousands of folios.

G. I am then to understand, that all this revenue is received and expended by the king.

P. Not in his own person, but by substitutes or deputies, to whom the administration of the executive power is entrusted by the crown.

G. How is the money disposed of?

P. A part of it is appropriated to the payment of the interest of the national debt, and a part to the payment of the civil list.

G. What is the civil list, Sir?

P. It is the list, roll, or catalogue of all expences of civil government, as those of his majesty's household, of the household of the queen and royal family, of salaries to the great officers
of

of state, to the judges, ambassadors, private expences of the king, secret service money, pensions, bounties; in a word, of every of the king's servants.

G. The civil list then, is properly the king's revenue, and what goes to pay the interest of the national debt is the revenue of the publick.

P. More strictly speaking, the latter is the revenue of the creditors of the publick; however, all is collected and distributed by officers of the crown.

G. So, if I receive a half-year's dividend at the Bank, it is the king who pays me by the hands of one of his clerks in administration.

P. Yes. Need I enter upon the article of *Influence*?

G. It would be no compliment to my understanding.

P. Allow me, however, to say, that the influence of the crown is an effect, which may have risen from two causes. It may have proceeded from a plan of arbitrary government, which, if so, must have been concerted long before the present generation existed; or it may have proceeded, without any such design, from a mere course of events, a set of accidents.

G. Some call this influence enormous and excessive.

P. This

P. This enormity of crown influence depends on something else. If the other two branches of legislature have equal influence, it is not enormous, for the state is safe when the component powers are in equilibrium: but if the influence of the crown preponderates so as to give irregular direction to the other two powers, then indeed it has acquired enormity.


G. What is your opinion, Sir?—

P. Rather say, what is the resolution of the House of Commons.

G. All the boys at school have that by heart, that is, that *the influence of the crown hath increased, is increasing, and* OUGHT TO BE DIMINISHED.

REPRE-

REPRESENTATION.



T H U R S D A Y.

R E P R E S E N T A T I O N.

P. **W**HEN we speak of administration, George, we speak of what *is*; but when we speak of representation, we speak of what *ought to be*.

G. Why so, Sir?

P. Because administration, you see, is in effect the king's prerogative, and we would not seem to want respect for that branch of government, the executive power.

G. But representation being the people's birthright, is more immediately our own province. Is that your meaning, Sir?

P. Exactly.

G. Are you represented in parliament, Sir?

P. No.

G. Then your family, consisting of more than twenty of us, is not represented.

P. No; our parliamentary representation is

I

not

not a representation of persons, but of property.

G. Is your property represented, Sir?

P. No. My estates are copyhold, and leasehold, and personal estate. I have no freehold.

G. It is not all property, then, that is represented.

P. No; it is property of that peculiar tenure, which we call freehold.

G. How many freeholders are there in this parish?

P. About four.

G. Yet this parish consists of some hundreds.

P. Yes; and I, who am not represented, was obliged to give old Sam the taylor, who botches for the labourers, who is represented, some pieces of wood to prop up his crazy freehold cottage, or else Sam's cottage would not have been represented.

G. You said you were speaking of what *ought to be*.

P. Excuse me for speaking first of what *ought not to be*.

G. You think representation then, Sir, imperfect?

P. Extremely so; and I think I see *four* imperfections

perfections in what we call parliamentary representation, in the nature, the subject, the mode, and the end. These are not constitutional imperfections, but accidental ones; the being of which probably originated not in design and depravity, but in a train of events. I will explain myself.

G. What do you mean, Sir, by the *nature* of representation?

P. The properties of it.

G. What ought these to be?

P. Representation is a human creation, and was intended to be, and therefore ought to be an exact balance to the prerogatives of the other branches of the legislature, for by this balance the liberties of the people are preserved from encroachment.

G. It ought then to have dignity, power, revenue, and influence, that so, having the same prerogatives as the crown, and in the same degree, it may be a counterpoise.

P. Exactly so. Accordingly the *dignity* of parliament, as an aggregate body, is preserved by an ascription of properties and perfections, as independence, incorruption, fidelity, magnanimity, and so on. The *power* of parliament is that of making laws. In regard to *revenue*, all supplies are raised by them; and in respect

to *influence*, it will always be proportional to the benefits which the people derive from their representatives.

G. You allowed yesterday, that the properties ascribed to the executive power, could not be found in any mortal. Are not the properties ascribed to the legislative power of the same kind, mere suppositions of law?

P. By no means. The properties ascribed to the person are, strictly speaking, found in the executive power. Executive power has ubiquity, for it is every where acting at the same time; besieging a town in the army, destroying an enemy's fleet at sea in the navy, guarding the trade in a convoy, or the coasts in a militia, distributing justice in courts of law, collecting customs in the ports, excise in warehouses, receiving and paying, rewarding and punishing at the same moment. Now as all this is the king's business, and as he executes it by deputation, we say he hath ubiquity, and so of the rest.

G. His majesty then has this property in proxy?

P. Yes; but as our representatives are themselves proxies for us, they cannot vote by proxy, and herein they differ from lords of parliament, who sit there in their own right, and who therefore can vote by proxy. And further,

as they cannot delegate any to act in their stead, so it is impossible they should possess any perfections, except such as are personal. These are in some degree in each individual, and in a high degree in the collective body, and these I call the nature of representation.

G. You said *independence* was one property of parliament.

P. It is an essential property interwoven in the constitution, and it implies the absence of all undue influence of every kind. Neither the crown, by means of the army, or the officers of some branches of the revenue, nor the peers, by means of lords of parliament, or lords lieutenants of counties, may interfere. No, nor may the candidates themselves use any bribery or corrupt influence under heavy penalties.

G. You said *incorruption* was another property.

P. Yes, for a man may go uninfluenced into the house, and become corruptible by strong temptations there: in such a case, he would cease to be *faithful* to the trust reposed in him by the people, and of course would lay aside all that elevation of soul, which we call *magnanimity*, and would sink from the noblest of all creatures, an object of public confidence, to the despicable state of a minister's tool.

G. Have

G. Have not our legislators claimed these excellent properties, and passed many laws to secure them ?

P. They have : but it is confessed, all means have been found inadequate.

G. Who can help it ?

P. Not they who are so infatuated as not to see it, nor they who are so interested as to deny it, nor they who spend life in declaiming against human depravity.

G. Who then ?

P. Such as understand the Lord's Prayer, *lead us not into temptation.*

G. How do you mean, Sir ?

P. Why I mean, that if human frailty is so great, it ought not to be put to such severe trials as endanger the virtue and felicity of a person, a family, a county, a kingdom, a world ; for a British parliament may affect all these.

G. So you would keep men virtuous, by putting it out of their power to be vicious.

P. What can you do with them ?

G. But is this possible ?

P. Every thing that ought to be is possible. How much money do you think was spent at our last election ?

G. It was reported above a hundred thousand pounds.

P. Well,

P. Well, let us suppose only a hundred thousand pounds. Upon whom was this spent?

G. Upon freehold electors. Old Sam was drunk for a week.

P. Suppose the electors had been ten times as many?

G. Why then ten times as much must have been spent. It would have cost a million.

P. And suppose instead of electing representatives for seven years, we had elected them only for one?

G. Then our seat in parliament would cost a million a year.

P. Would not annual parliaments and equal representation, put it absolutely out of the power of the whole world to destroy the independence of parliament?

G. It should seem so: at least it is worth trying. But have we a RIGHT to these?

P. We have both a natural and constitutional right to these. Septennial parliaments are of late date, triennial are not much older, and it was no longer ago than the reign of Henry VI. that the people at large were deprived of this right, and the qualification of electors for knights of the shire, determined, to be the owning of a freehold of the value of forty shillings a year, which by the way was then equivalent to
twenty

twenty pounds of present value. As to boroughs, we say nothing of them under this article, they do not deserve it.

G. You spoke of the *subject* of representation, Sir?

P. Yes, I ask *what* is represented. What ought to be represented?

G. The people undoubtedly.

P. Not dead houses and lands?

G. No. Bona fide, the people themselves.

P. What! all the people?

G. If all the people have lives, liberties, and properties, all the people have a natural right to choose the guardians of them.

P. They have also a constitutional one.

G. Would not this endanger property, by putting the poor on a level with the rich?

P. Neither property nor person ought to be endangered: but if one must suffer, better damage property than person; however, this is no question here, for the danger of both lies elsewhere, I mean in undue influence, not in the numbers of electors or elected. Keep representation pure and uninfluenced, and all things are safe.

G. But is such an election practicable?

P. As easy as the election of a coroner, or a sheriff in the city.

G. What

G. What fault do you find, Sir, with the *mode* of representation?

P. The establishment of the forementioned qualification having changed the subject of representation from person to property, you would suppose property was equally represented.

G. Certainly I should, whatever is represented ought to be equally represented.

P. Look at this scheme.

“ A scheme of the proportions of the several counties in England paid to the land-tax in 1693, and to the subsidies in 1697, compared with the number of members they send to parliament.”

“ In this scheme the proportions are thus considered, viz. That as the whole kingdom sends 513 members to parliament, so the whole of each tax is divided into 513 equal parts; and the first column shewing the name of the county, the second shews how many of the 513 parts each county paid to the land-tax in 1693, the third how many of the 513 parts each county paid to the subsidies in 1697, and the fourth, how many of the 513 members each county sends to parliament.”

K

Counties

Counties	Parts of the land-tax	Parts of the subsidy	Parliament members
Bedford	7	4	4
Berks	10	8	9
Bucks	12	7	14
Cambridge	9	6	6
Chester	7	5	4
Cornwall*	8	5	44
Cumberland*	1	1	6
Derby	6	4	4
Devon*	21	19	26
Dorset*	9	6	20
Durham*	3	4	4
Essex	14	13	8
Gloucester	12	8	8
Hereford	5	4	8
Hertford	11	8	6
Huntingdon	4	3	4
Kent	22	15	18
Lancaster*	5	7	14
Leicester	9	7	4
Lincoln	19	11	12
Middlesex	80	185	8
Monmouth	3	2	3
Norfolk	22	20	12
Northampton	12	8	9
Northumberland*	4	3	8
Nottingham	7	4	8
Oxon	10	7	9
Rutland	2	1	2
Salop	7	6	12
Somerset	19	15	18
Southampton*	14	11	26
Stafford	7	6	10

Counties.	Parts of the land tax.	Parts of the subsidy.	Parliament members.
Suffolk	20	15	16
Surrey	18	16	14
Suffex	16	10	28
Warwick	20	8	6
Westmoreland *	1	1	4
Wilts *	13	8	34
Worcester	9	7	9
York *	24	23	30
Wales	11	12	24
All England and Wales }	513	513	513
	Land.	Subs.	Memb.
Note, That the proportions of the 6 northern and 5 western counties marked thus * are }	103	88	216
And that Mid- dlesex and Essex }	104	198	16
are			

Cities are included in their respective counties.

You see Middlesex, which paid 80 parts of the tax, and 185 of the subsidy, sent only 8 members to parliament; and Cornwall, which paid only 8 parts of the tax, and 5 of the subsidy sent 44. Is this proportional?

K 2

G. No,

G. No, surely.


P. There is a worse article than this in the present management. Canvassing, carousing, intoxication, bribery, perjury, and all the usual attendants on a modern election, disgrace candidates, and destroy all confidence in them, and at the same time deprave and debauch the morals of the whole community. In the democratical part of our constitution, there is an exercise of sovereignty by suffrage: but never was the majesty of democracy so debased as it is in some elections. Candidates lose all reverence for the people, their constituents, and the people lose all that respect and reverence for representatives, which men in such high trust should always retain.

G. The means being thus ineffectual, the end of representation is not answered. Is that your meaning, Sir?


P. Yes, verily. Why is democracy interwoven in our constitution with aristocracy and monarchy? Is it not for the sake of its political virtue? And if it ceases to be virtuous, will it not yield to the frictions of wisdom and power essential to the other two parts? In such a case is not the very existence of our constitution in danger, and ought not all possible remedies to be applied? It would be as absurd to deprive the crown of power, and the nobles
of

of consultation, as it would be to defraud the people of virtue. I mean all along *political virtue*; the people's thorough knowledge, just estimation, and actual disposal by unbiaſſed ſuffrage of their lives, liberties and properties, and all their natural rights.—I forgot you was a ſcholar, George, take a cruſt of Ovid with you—

——— *Magna fuit cenſuque viriſque
Perque decem potuit tantum dare ſanguinis annos,
Nunc humilis veteres tantummodo Troja ruinas
Et pro divitiis tumulos oſtendit avorum.*



T A X A T I O N.



F R I D A Y.

T A X A T I O N.

P. **I** THINK we agree that every man has a *natural* right to his property, be it little or much.

G. We allow further, that his passing out of a natural state of solitude, into a *civil* state of society, does not alienate this right.

P. Individuals uniting together in society, have a joint interest in securing to each other the enjoyment of this right, and it is one principal excellence of our constitution, that though the giving up a part in trust to one of the community, to be employed for the protection and benefit of the whole, be absolutely necessary to the private enjoyment of the rest, yet not the least atom is to be given without their free consent.

G. A great excellence it is, but no more than a right.

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P. True.

P. True. Taxation strikes me in *eight* points of light. A sort of arrangement may serve for a clue to guide us. The first is the *origin* of taxes.

G. Do you mean to enter on a history of taxation, Sir?

P. No, no. A history of oppression would not convince you, that you ought to be oppressed. I mean what makes taxes necessary?

G. The expences of government, I presume?

P. Yes; and the expences of government include a great many articles, as the expences of a family do. Some are necessary for safety and defence, some for convenience, some for pleasure, some for justice, some for generosity, all for the publick good; but none for vicious or needless purposes.

G. Of all this I have understood, it is the ancient indisputable right of the House of Commons in the first instance to judge.

P. They have the *sole* right of raising and modelling the supply.

G. Whence have the representatives this right but from their constituents?

P. They do derive it from their principals, the people; and in this instance, in spite of Voltaire, the MAJESTY of the people is avowed by
our

our constitution, for the Commons tax the Peers as well as themselves; but they never suffer the Peers to tax them, nor even to amend or alter their money bills; a rejection is all the power they allow them, as jealous in this article of the Upper House as of the crown.

G. Taxes, then, ought not to be raised without just and necessary causes, of which the people by their representatives are sole and competent judges.

P. Certainly. The next article that strikes me is the *quantity* of taxation.

G. How would you rate this?

P. As I do my own expences.

G. You would ascertain your income; then provide for your family, and then apply the surplus to what you thought most expedient.

P. Yes; and I would judge of this expedience, by estimating the object of my pursuit, and by comparing my own means to obtain it. Can I spare so much, and is the purchase worth what I can spare? These questions, simple and easy as they are in little matters, become extremely difficult in large, complex, political cases; and hence the absolute necessity of a minister's attention to all and every source of information, and particularly to popular parlia-

mentary investigation, for the people are most likely to know what they can afford to part with. What millions of publick money have been spent to purchase nothing, or worse than nothing, guilt and infamy.

G. You mean in war, I suppose. How mortifying is the thought! The most bloody and expensive wars in the world have been about things of no importance.

P. Ah! there lies the ruinous mischief, war! *Bella, horrida bella!*

G. So they said two thousand years ago, yet we go on!

P. Who go on? It is not the people—the crime lies elsewhere. As there are very few just wars, and very few disputes worth the blood and treasure spent to decide them, so there are very few nations that can afford long to support them, because there are very few governors of nations that place the felicity of the executive power in the commerce and wealth, the freedom and happiness of the people.

G. Is there no way of simplifying taxation so as to ascertain what a nation can afford to spend in wars and disputes?

P. I have thought it not impossible, especially if we advert to the *nature* of our taxes; this is a third point of light in which they may be considered.

G. O^f

G. Of what nature are they ?

P. I mean to distinguish between principal and interest. The principal is borrowed and spent, and the taxes are mortgaged to pay the creditors ; or to familiarize the matter, what can our neighbour Sir Richard afford to spend in law suits ? You know his condition, he has a good estate, a part is his lady's jointure, the rest is mortgaged to pay the interest of money which he has borrowed and spent. Suppose his lady's jointure to support his family, and if you please resemble this to our civil list. Suppose his rents to yield more than will pay the interest of the mortgage, and resemble this to the surplus remaining after the creditors of the public are paid : this surplus is the whole in either case, that can be spared for litigation, and this ought not to be applied to such a purpose till the mortgage is lessened, if not paid off.

G. Suppose the nation at peace, and wholly or nearly out of debt ?

P. I doubt whether, if it could be, it would be prudent now wholly to discharge the national debt : but even in such a case, I should imagine, that so much as the balance of *foreign* trade was in our favour, and no more, could we, strictly speaking, afford to expend in foreign disputes and wars. Happy, too happy, if we could accumulate wealth, till we could afford to lend
other

other nations on proper security, and so attach them to our interest !

G. If this point of light be not just, it is at least pleasing.

P. There is a pretty sure criterion of judging of the balance of foreign trade, that is, by the course of exchange, and it is very certain the annual expence ought not to exceed the annual revenue.

G. Have we exceeded this ?

P. We have exceeded it beyond belief. The national supplies, which have been raised within the last hundred years, that is, from the accession of William and Mary, 1688, to the present time, exceed the sum of five hundred millions, and of this enormous sum, almost two hundred millions are funded, and we are loaded with perpetual taxes to pay the interest ; and this in several capital articles not for the dignity or safety of the nation, but for purposes ignorant or atrocious.

G. How are the people brought to consent to such ruinous measures ?

P. This is the fourth light I view taxation in, *the method of obtaining the people's money*. We mentioned just now our neighbour, Sir Richard.

G. We did.

P. Sir Richard had once a thrifty steward, a man of real business and integrity, who so managed

naged the estate as to supply all his master's real wants, and to maintain his rank with dignity. Old Solomon, the Jew, who had accumulated a great sum of money in trade, and wanted to make an exorbitant interest of it with good security, contrived to insinuate himself into the favour of Sir Richard, and in short induced him to part with his steward, and to place in his office a man of great dissipation and of no management. What Solomon expected came to pass. The estate neglected did not yield, and the family all dissipated and extravagant, required more as the revenue became less, and presently all were in want of money. Solomon's eldest son gravely offered to befriend his neighbour in distress, and lent large sums to supply present exigencies, requiring nothing, good honest man, except proper security in case of death; and some discounts because he must put himself to great inconveniences to advance large sums at short notice, especially upon securities that would not yield for some time. In brief, Solomon became the friend of the family; favours, privileges, and douceurs were heaped upon him, and his friendship has nearly completed the ruin of all the family.

G. Who was most to blame, Solomon or the steward?

P. Solomon and steward were satan and sinner;

ner: but Sir Richard himself was most to blame for not looking into his affairs. He should either have done this himself, or frequently have examined and audited his steward.

G. Suffer me not to misunderstand you, Sir. You think Great Britain an estate that belongs to the people?

P. Certainly I do. I have so many acres of land, and you have a street of houses, one of your uncles has merchandize, and another corn, cattle, wool, money, and so on.

G. And you think there are many Solomons in Great Britain, who have no notions of right and wrong, and whose whole science is gain and loss?

P. Undoubtedly I do. Multitudes of such men live upon the publick spoil. Solomon's Rabbi flatters him, his solicitor glosses for him, his attorney puzzles, and his porter and Sir Richard's gamekeeper bully for him, his tradesmen and servants all contrive to please him for the same glorious reason, for which he humours Sir Richard, that is, because they gain by doing so.

G. The evil lies then in our public stewards, our representatives, for they need not ruin us to enrich this class of men.

P. No, the evil lies in yourselves, you should
look

look into your own affairs, audit your steward's accounts once a year, and change hands 'till you get good and capable men.

G. Suppose we have not virtue to do so?

P. There wants no virtue, sense of shame is enough. The fear of bankruptcy generally makes the indolent industrious, and the drunken sober: when it does not their condition is desperate.

G. In what other light do you view taxation, Sir?

P. I consider *the manner of laying and collecting them.*

G. Taxes ought to be laid and collected in the manner most agreeable to the people that pay them.

P. The thing speaks for itself. Suppose I agree to allow you, some time hence as soon as I can spare it, twenty pounds to dispose of as you please, would it be proper for you to go immediately, put yourself into a present condition of want by your extravagance, and borrow seven pounds of the carpenter, seven of the gardener, seven of the miller, and seven of the brewer, in all twenty-eight, and to oblige me to let the first fell timber to pay himself, the second pillage my garden, the third cut and carry my wheat, and the fourth my barley, in consideration of the debt and the interest, and the favour of advancing the money, and so on?

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G. It

G. It would be a cruel conspiracy, and our having power to effect it would not change its nature.

P. The most odious tax in this country is the excise, the most expensive in collecting, the most injurious to trade and home consumption, and the least consistent with our free constitution. The most safe and proper tax is the land-tax, and the most agreeable is the postage of letters.

G. We always pay this tax with pleasure at school when we receive letters from home.

P. The carriage of letters is really a business in the hands of government, and the profits are the tax. The people pay it cheerfully, because they have something for their money.

G. Would it be difficult to exchange some of our most offensive taxes which hurt trade by transferring the property of the industrious into the hands of the idle, into other taxes similar to that of postage?

P. I think not. There are modes which would be more productive to government, and really advantageous to the people.

G. Is not the *influence* of taxation a considerable object?

P. Unquestionably. Taxes have an influence on government, elections, trade, industry, learning, genius, men and manners, and every thing else in a country; even the poultry have less food for the dearth of corn.

G. Is

G. Is it not very much in our power to diminish the influence of taxation in regard to ourselves ?

P. It is. You have an instance in this family. When you was a little boy, you remember wine brought to table after dinner ?

G. I do ; but I see none now, and I think the family full as well and as happy without it.

P. I believe it is. I hated the war, set the task-master, who taxed us to support it, at defiance, and got money and virtue by the taxes. The minister laid an additional duty on wine : we left off wine. He taxed spirits : your mother ordered rum and brandy to be put among the medicines. He taxed servants, we dismissed two. Thus as he laid on a tax, we lopped off a luxury, and though the family has increased from five children to twelve, and our income has stood as it was, yet we have not gone, as without these precautions we must have gone, either into debt or ruin.

G. The minister did not acquire your esteem by taxation ?

P. He filled me with pity and horror. The state of the sugar trade alone was sufficient to excite emotions of this kind. To see brown muscovado sugars from 26 shillings a hundred, the price in 1775, rise to 70 shillings a hundred,

the price in 1779. To see only 106 sugar houses, and some of them to be let in the city of London, where a few years before 159 were at work: to see coppersmiths, blacksmiths, plumbers, iron-founders, back-makers, potters, coopers, carters, builders of every description, all supported by these houses, unemployed: to see the immense consumption of coals and candles, scarcely to be equalled in any other trade, all stopped: to see the import decay no less than 45,000 hogheads a year; to see ruin in a thousand ways attendant on all this, was enough to make a harder heart than mine bleed.

G. These were influences you could not prevent, and they are justly chargeable on taxation, for no money for the minister, no war for the nation.

P. If we were to proceed to the actual *application*, and the *end* of taxation, I should detain you too long. Consider these at your leisure, and now only recollect the substance of what we have said. The mind, like the hand, in grasping at too much would lose all.

G. People in civil society, you say, have a *right* to their own property: but they ought to give up a part for the preservation of the rest. This part ought to be *freely* given for *just and necessary causes* both domestick and foreign, of which the givers or their deputies are competent judges.


judges. The *quantity* given ought to bear a proportion to the *ability* of the proprietors, and to the *importance* of the end to be obtained. British taxes are in great part *interest* of money already expended. The *method* of obtaining them has neither been honourable nor just: but the people have the remedy in their own hands. The *mode* of laying and collecting some of them has not been the most eligible: but even this is remediable. The *influence* will be as extensive as the sums; and if the sums be enormous they will have an enormous influence on trade, government, and every thing else. The *application* is not always to the purposes for which they were raised, and the original *end* and design for which taxation is allowed in a free state is totally defeated. Is not this the substance, Sir?

P. It is.

G. Is there no calling a wasteful steward to account?

P. Hah! have you found that out? Well, Responsibility to-morrow.

RESPON-



RESPONSIBILITY.

THE LIBRARY OF THE

S A T U R D A Y.

R E S P O N S I B I L I T Y.

P. **S**O you think people in public trusts are accountable to their constituents ?

G. Can any man assign a good reason why they should not ?

P. What can a poor scholar do, who has nothing but his own lips to live on ? He must learn to find reasons for every thing, even reasons for not reasoning at all.

G. I don't think much reasoning necessary on this subject.

P. Nor I, if the subject be properly stated. Responsibility, or responsibleness, if you will, is a state of obligation to answer, or account. I should choose to distribute this subject into parts by distinguishing objects, and to simplify each part by a familiar question.

G. Be it so.

P. First, then, let us consider a *private trust*, natural and civil. I look upon you, and the

N

rest

rest of my children, as committed to my trust by the God of *nature*; and I consider myself as accountable, or responsible, for my discharge of this trust, both to God and you. It is a motive of my care. When you became a man, what would you think of me if I had neglected or abandoned you?

G. I should not be able to reverence you in such a case. In a desert I should despise you; perhaps, left to native ferocity, I should avenge myself.

P. But as you was not born in a desert, but in Britain, my natural obligation is confirmed by a *civil* tie. Suppose I had abandoned you in infancy, or disease, or impotence?

G. The law would have provided for me, and would have punished you.

P. Is this an excellence in our law, or a defect?

G. An excellence undoubtedly; for though the civil motive is no motive to you, yet there are too many who have no motive but that.

P. Responsibility is a motive both to me and them; responsibility to man moves them; to God me. What is a *publick trust*?

G. It consists of that, which men give up for living in society.

P. You mean, men retain some of their
natural

natural rights in civil society, and they put the rest in trust?

G. So I understand it. The honour and dignity of being chief, is given up in trust to one, who is so much the more sovereign, as the the sovereign rights of many are lodged in him.

P. Then honour is in publick trust?

G. Yes, and so is wealth and power; and so it should seem, are all the other rights of mankind in a free state.

P. They are not annihilated, then, you do not mean by giving up, giving up the ghost?

G. No certainly. You have not given up the right of killing a man, have you, Sir?

P. No; I have only put that right of self-defence into the hands of legislature, and they shoot the French, and drown the Spaniards, if they attempt to invade my estate on the coast; and they seize, imprison, try, and hang my neighbour for me if he attempts my life.

G. Suppose the persons in trust should abuse their trust, and should seize you or your property, instead of the French and the highwayman?

P. I should think I ought to resume my right, and put it into honest hands. You don't think men give up their senses to their governors in trust?

G. No, certainly; and what they do give up are entrusted, not alienated.

P. Publick trusts, then, are in their nature, and ought to be in every form of civil government, in a state of responsibility.

G. As far as publick trusts are greater and more important than private trusts, so much more reason is there that the holders of them should be responsible.

P. I ask then a third question. Can there be a safe good government without responsibility?

G. What is a good civil government?

P. That, of every form, in which the end of civil government is obtained—that is, civil and religious liberty.

G. If it were formed ever so well, it would soon degenerate into tyranny, without responsibility.

P. How so?

G. Because, constitute a civil government of what you will, and that part which is left without controul, will, on that very account, rise above, and domineer over the rest.

P. It would, and you see there would be no remedy. The end, liberty, would be defeated by the means, government. I am always, therefore, astonished, when I hear men talk of absolute

absolute and uncontrollable sovereignty in a prince, omnipotence in a parliament, despotism somewhere in a state; they convince me of nothing except that they understand the way up stairs.

G. Has the British constitution responsibility in it?

P. I intended to come to this as a fourth question. It has the reputation of it; for every writer who praises our government, praises it because one component part is a check on another, and if this be not the check, I know not where to find it.

G. But have we not many examples in our history of the people's calling their administrators to account, and punishing them for breach of trust?

P. Suppose we had not one, what then?

G. Then we should want precedent.

P. But should we be left without law? There must have been a first time, in the history of the world, of calling culprits of every kind to account.

G. True; but I recollect several instances of it in our history.

P. Every body knows a great many cases, in which the executive power has been called to account, by means of indictments and parliamentary impeachments,

G. The

G. The executive power ?

P. Yes ; not the king in his own person ; but his counsellors and wicked ministers, without whose instrumentality the king cannot misuse his power ; and in this stands the wisdom of our maxim of ascribing perfection to the supreme governor. Could the person of the supreme governor be culpable in the eye of the law, he might be arrested, imprisoned, tried and condemned, and then the remedy would be worse than the disease, the bonds of government would be dissolved, and civil war would ensue : but as he executes his high office by administration, and as all his servants are obliged to act according to law, the punishment of the servants answers every end of safety to society, for they know it is at their peril to take the prince's will instead of law for a rule of action. Beside, if the person of the supreme governor in such a state as ours were capable of culpability, the danger of calling him to account would be so great, by reason of the powerful opposition he would be always able to make, that no person would dare to attempt it, for fear of consequences to himself, and the law would defeat itself, it would be governing too much : but in the present state, the calling of an administrator to
account

account is comparatively easy, and answers all the ends necessary to the happiness of society.

G. I believe it is allowed by all, that the three parts of our governing powers are mutually accountable to each other, and there are many instances of each calling the other to account, so that some of our kings have been dethroned, one fled from the fury of the people; and abdicated the throne, and one was actually put to death.

P. None of them understood the true principles of our constitution. The last took an active personal part in oppressive and illegal measures, as going to the house to seize the members, and though there was an informality in his trial, yet that as well as many other parts of our history shew, that there is a line beyond which the people cannot bear oppression, and that right to call rulers to account was always understood to belong to the people.

G. Allowing right, is there law for the exercise of the right?

P. Never was right of resistance more clearly ascertained, and passive obedience and non-resistance more fully exploded in any nation than in ours at the Revolution, the whole went on the principle of responsibility, and the same act of settlement, that vested succession to the crown in the present illustrious family, was in effect an

act

act of rejection, not of an administration, but of a person and a family, who had, by presuming to set themselves above controul, dissolved that social bond, by which they and their constituents were connected.

G. Did the legislative power in our constitution call the executive to account in their own right, or in that of the people?

P. In that of the people, certainly.

G. Then the people have a right to call them to account?

P. Who can doubt it? But there is one question more concerning *expedience*.

G. I understand you, Sir. Granting that responsibility is a natural state of right, and that it is allowed and incorporated in our government, and that we have both law and precedent to confirm it, yet it would still remain a question, when is it expedient to make use of this right?

P. I mean exactly so. The expedience of such a measure is a conclusion which ought to be drawn from a great many cool, deliberate, well-weighed premises. Do you think this the time?

G. By no means.

P. Why.

G. Because under such an administration as
the

the present, (I only take the liberty to repeat what you said last night at supper to my uncle) composed of as great and good statesmen as ever adorned this, or any other country, we may expect the radical evils, that have accidentally crept into our government, to be thoroughly cleared away. You said, their wisdom, application and fidelity, were equal to the government of half a world.

P. I spoke as I thought, and I own I expect from their beneficent hands not a temporary quietus, but substantial and lasting improvements, founding in our liberty the happiness of posterity, and an immortality of reputation to themselves.

G. Suppose you should be deceived?

P. It is not to be supposed.

G. May we not for argument sake imagine the worst?

P. Imagine the worst. Suppose only a few popular acts done to ingratiate administration with the people, and no attempts made to restore to the people at large that equal and universal representation, that purity of the democratical part of our constitution, to which we have an indubitable right, and which is a certain and effectual relief for many of the ills of which we so openly complain. Suppose all this, what then?

O

G. Why

G. Why then where is your power to enforce responsibility?

P. Where it always was, in the people themselves.

G. But by what exertions?

P. By a general, calm, peaceable, but firm and resolute declaration of right. Governors know the people must be heard, when they are unanimous and firm. You have supposed a case or two, give me leave in my turn to suppose one founded on a fact. There was once a parliament in England, which expressly gave to royal proclamations the force of law. Suppose a modern parliament should do so?

G. I should say they were guilty of breach of trust, and had subverted the constitution.


P. You would say, with the great Locke, that *there remains at all times inherent in the people, A SUPREME POWER to alter or remove the legislative, for when they find the legislative act contrary to the trust reposed in them, the trust is abused and forfeited, and devolves to those who gave it.*

GENERALIS.

7

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GENERALISSIMO.



M O N D A Y.

G E N E R A L I S S I M O.

G. **A** Generalissimo is a supreme commander.

P. Of what?

G. I thought of the military: but my uncle has puzzled me. I went to his room this morning as usual to pay my respects to him, and to enquire after his health; and, among other things, he said, George, ask your father who is general of the excise army, and who is Lord of hosts, or general of the church army, and desire him to inform you who raises, and officers, and animates, and pays these troops, who keep garrison, who take the field, to whom they swear, and for whom they fight?

P. I understand him. He loves a little mirth.

G. The generalissimo of our contemplation
is

is the supreme commander of the military and maritime force?

P. Yes; and it is this force, chiefly the military, and particularly in the state of a standing army, that we intend to examine. Let us go to the bottom of the subject, on what principle is force necessary to a free state?

G. On the great leading principle the happiness of the state.

P. Of the whole state?

G. Certainly, not of a part of it.

P. How does force contribute to this happiness?

G. By placing the state in a condition of safety from foreign attempts to injure it.

P. Then armies are not intended in a free state to operate on the people who employ them?

G. No; it is impossible to suppose a people capable of choosing to be dragooned.

P. Then you are no friend to a standing army?

G. Pardon me, Sir, the question is complex, and I am not yet master of all the ideas that compose it. Army stands for ten thousand, and army stands for a hundred thousand men. If a country be so extended as to require a hundred thousand men to defend it, then I am a friend to a standing force of a hundred thousand men :
but

but if a country requires only ten thousand men to defend it, then I should think the other ninety thousand might be better employed.

P. I see you have a rule of proportion in your mind. You first think, what is the use, the end and design of an army; you next determine the just and proper quantum necessary to answer the end, which is the guard of the inhabitants of a district of a given size, and subject to such and such injuries; and having determined how many men are necessary to this purpose, you think the rest superfluous.

G. Yes; and I think a superfluity of armed men is a superfluity of fire, active in its nature, and therefore dangerous.

P. Where is the danger of twenty or thirty thousand superfluous men in arms?

G. They must all be fed and clothed, and paid, they must have arms and ammunition, and all this expence falls on the people. Is not this an injury to property?

P. Do you see any other inconvenience?

G. Men unemployed contract habits of idleness or profligacy, and both are injurious to the morals of a state.

P. Do you think morality of consequence to a state?

G. There is a set of just and proper actions essential to its prosperity, yea; to its existence.

There

There is a set of domestick virtues essential to the peace of a family ; a set of trade virtues essential to the prosperity of commerce ; there is a set of political virtues essential to the glory of a kingdom ; and there is a set of religious virtues essential to the worship of Almighty God. I have been taught so.

P. Is an unemployed army remarkable for these virtues ?

G. I am sorry to say quite the reverse.

P. To omit the rest, is a standing army friendly to political virtue ?

G. How can a standing army befriend political virtue, when a standing army is under the absolute command of one single general, and when submission to orders is the indispensable law of every individual ?

P. The connections that make a slave make a tyrant !

G. Forgive me a moment. Old nurse Piper came yesterday to see her child as she calls me.

P. Well.

G. I inquired how her son did, and she fell a crying. O ! exclaimed she, he is ruined, and we are all undone ! He was the kindest creature in the parish before he went into the militia ; but now he has lost every good quality, and has brought home nothing but an order, an oath, and a blow.

P. Had

P. Had the old woman read history, she might have illustrated the doctrine of orders, and oaths, and blows, by the ruin of many a kingdom, if that would have comforted her. However, you distinguish between a militia raised for temporary defence, or a few troops kept in lieu of them for the same purpose, and a standing army.

G. I do; I allow the necessity of the first on a principle of self-preservation, I dislike the last for many reasons, and one is because it makes arms a profession.

P. You think it an unlawful profession?

G. I do; for a man to give himself up to learn the art of destroying his fellow creatures, and to let himself out for hire to destroy whomsoever his commander shall doom to destruction, and this without retaining a right to judge of the justice or injustice of the order, and to make a merit of implicit obedience in such a bloody business, argues the soul of a slave, and is never found general, till a nation has sunk into the lowest degree of political depravity.

P. So much for principles; let us come to facts. " Our constitution knows no such state as that of a perpetual standing soldier, bred up to no other profession than that of war, and it was not till the reign of Henry VII. that the kings of England had so much as a guard about

P

their

their persons." These are the words of Judge Blackstone.

G. What is the present constitutional force for the safety and defence of the kingdom?

P. The militia, consisting of a certain number of the inhabitants of every county chosen by lot for three years, and officered by the Lord Lieutenant of the county, the deputy lieutenants, and the principal landholders, under a commission from the crown.

G. But we have a standing army in time of peace?

P. We have: but so jealous have our legislators been, that they are actually disbanded at the expiration of every year, unless continued by parliament.

G. Are all these forces entrusted with the crown?

P. All; and a great and important trust it is.

G. How are they regulated?

P. By an annual act of parliament, called the Mutiny Bill, an act as inconsistent with the free constitution of this country as can be conceived.

G. How so.

P. By this act, a soldier disobeying the lawful commands of his superior officer is doomed

to suffer such punishment as a court martial shall inflict, though it extend to death itself.

G. Who appoints this court martial?

P. The crown.

G. And by what law do that court judge?

P. By articles of war formed by his majesty.

G. In this case the crown is entrusted with both legislative and executive power absolute?

P. Exactly so.

G. Is not the military then in a state of servitude, and is not their slavery dangerous to our liberty?

P. I think so.

G. What reconciles our nobility and gentry to this state of subjection to arbitrary power?

P. Perhaps dissipation, which renders the pay necessary. Perhaps ambition, which always runs the road of honour. Perhaps fashion, which seldom consults reason. Perhaps their opinion of the mild character of the king, who, they trust, will not make an unkind use of his power.

G. How could armies be governed without severe laws? Were soldiers allowed to examine the orders of their superiors before they executed them, the delay might occasion great damage?

P. Sometime ago your uncle, who loves
P 2 horses,


horses, complained to your mother, that though he kept three fine hunters, yet he could not ride with any pleasure to himself, or with safety to his life and limbs. She did not inquire what made the horses unmanageable, for she knew it was owing to little exercise and high keeping; but she asked him why he kept three for his own riding when he rode but little, and never more than one at a time. He took the hint, disposed of two, and now rides safe and easy.

G. Suppose a nation long habituated to keep a standing army, many families interested in the continuance of one, and laws to perpetuate it?

P. I reply in the language of one of the greatest ornaments of this age. "*All the nations now in the world, who, in consequence of the tameness and folly of their predecessors, are subject to arbitrary power, have a right to emancipate themselves as soon as they can.*"

AGGRAN-

AGGRANDIZEMENT.



T U E S D A Y.

A G G R A N D I Z E M E N T.

P. **W**HAT is the support of grandeur, George?

G. Riches, Sir.

P. And what of riches?

G. Trade.

P. And what of trade?

G. A good market.

P. If then old farmer Davis have a good market for his wool, and corn, and cattle, and butter and cheese, he can afford to pay his landlord more rent, and to lay out more money with tradesmen, than if he had no way to dispose of his produce?

G. Certainly.

P. And the tradesmen can afford to pay a higher rent for their shops and houses with Davis's custom than without it?

G. No doubt.

P. The

P. The landlord will have a larger income, and can afford to contribute more to his own and the national grandeur?

G. Clearly.

P. Does it not seem, then, that the grandeur of a state rises naturally out of its wealth, its wealth out of commerce, and its commerce out of consumption?

G. It should seem so.

P. Three articles, then, present themselves to our view as worthy of national attention, the production, the preparation, and the consumption of marketable commodities.

G. Each, I perceive already, an article of considerable magnitude.

P. And therefore the more worthy of our investigation. By the subject of our conversation, marketable commodities, I mean any thing that will fetch money, gold and clay, timber and trinkets, animals and vegetables, materials raw and manufactured, the list would fill a volume.

G. I suppose Great Britain of the staple articles of universal traffick is the most productive country in the world.

P. Is, did you say? Have you forgot your tour with me last summer into Scotland and Wales?

G. I

G. I beg pardon; I ought to have said, *might be*.

P. What I inquire is this, do the lands and the quarries, the forests and the mines, the rivers and the coasts, produce what they might be made to produce with proper management?

G. By no means?

P. What is the chief cause?

G. I imagine there are several causes: but the principal probably is poverty.

P. In few and partial cases an estate may be unproductive from inattention, ignorance, negligence, dissipation, indolence, and so on: but in cases of this magnitude, private fortunes are not equal to the undertakings with any probability of success. Great objects like these require national efforts, parliamentary aids, noble exertions. Had a few of the millions wasted in war, been employed in these beneficial purposes, Britain might have been by this time a garden of pleasure, a store-house of plenty!

G. So, we have spent millions to conquer deserts at the end of the globe, and left a fruitful country to become a desert at home.

P. Of thirty-nine millions of acres in England, near ten millions, or a fourth part of the whole, consists of heaths, moors, mountains,

Q

and

and barren lands, and this exclusive of woods, forests, parks, commons and roads. Were these recovered to the growth of grain, hemp, flax, hops, rape, saffron, potatoes, and so on, or to the support of animals of any kind in the greatest quantities they could bear, I should call all this *production*.

G. Ten millions of acres is a colony, and the cultivation of it attainable without blood, with half the number of men employed to shed it, and at a small expence all returnable to the community, and vested ultimately in the state.

P. In spite of neglect, and in spite of all the obstacles to improvements, which remnants of the old fœdal system oppose against them, our country is rich in the production of marketable commodities, and these, several of them, such as we now fetch from foreign markets.

G. I suppose, you think, Sir, we might turn the scale, and carry our productions to their markets.

P. This implies what I call *preparation*. If you could open a lead mine, or set up a pottery, you would soon see a town rise round it. Grow hemp or flax, and spinners and weavers will surround you, and prepare it for market, and the same may be said of almost all raw materials. Industrious manufacturers enrich a state both by
their

their labour and consumption : but these arts flourish only under mild and serene governments, where labourers and artists are secured and set at ease in their liberties and properties, and where their honest endeavours are not blasted by burdensome taxes.

G. What you call preparations include not only manufactures, but all things necessary to be done in order to bring productions to market ?

P. Exactly so. Our manufactures, both of domestick and foreign materials, as wool, leather, metals, linens, cotton, glass, paper, and so on, may all be extended much further than they are, and with infinite advantage to the state.

G. And the increase of them would increase land and water carriage, and all the workmen and materials necessary to both ; and, above all, seamen and shipping, the defence and glory of Britain.

P. Undoubtedly : but there is one fatal mistake which lies at the bottom of all our ill policy in these articles, and that is, that *necessity* is the principle which sets the poor a working.

G. What is the true principle of the industry of the poor ?

P. *Encouragement*. Restraints of trade should be removed—duties taken off—prices of raw materials reduced—bounties judiciously distri-

buted—exportation promoted—immunities from some public offices or services granted—and so on. All these require great and national aids.

G. Perhaps the state cannot afford these great aids ?

P. Suppose I kept a nominal gardener, whose place was a sinecure, with a salary of three hundred a year, could not I dismiss him and afford to employ two hundred a year to set the poor to work till they could support themselves, and save a hundred a year myself too ?

G. You think, then, that it is not the poverty of the state, but the misapplication of public money, that keeps this poor country in its present dejected state ?

P. What signifies what I think ? All wise men in England who are not interested in living upon public money, and, to their immortal glory, some who are, think so.

G. I have heard say, that the destruction of the youth of this country proceeds from their fixing their eye on public money.

P. I believe it. How much money, think you, do the inhabitants of this kingdom pay annually in taxes ?

G. I can't tell.

P. I question whether any body can, but the
most

most probable calculation is about twelve millions.

G. Twelve millions !

P. Patience ! I have not done. More than twelve millions are paid directly, and indirectly at least a fourth more, in all fifteen millions a year, a sum equal to the whole specie of the kingdom.

G. By indirect payments you mean such additions to the prices of commodities as are made by what dealers lay on, and other incidents occasioned by taxes ?

P. I do, beside the loss to the public of the labour of all such as are employed in taxation, and other such articles.

G. Do you include in this estimate poor rates, county-rates, and tithes ?

P. No, I do not, all these are to be added.

G. At this rate the nation ought to have upwards of sixty millions of specie to carry on trade : but if it has not twenty, how does it support itself ?

P. As a merchant supports himself when he has not property equal to his commerce, by credit and paper currency.

G. Happy for him that his creditors don't all run upon him at once ; till they do, he can borrow of you to pay me.

P. His

P. His wisdom is, to preserve his credit by frugality, industry, and improvement. Give a man of these qualities time and means, and he will surmount all suspicion, and realize a property that originally was nominal.

G. My uncle is so eager for œconomy as a ground of plenty, that he says, when a bishop goes to heaven he would not appoint a successor, but would put the profits of the bishoprick into the hands of a committee, under the inspection of proper officers, to be employed for the encouragement of trade and manufactures, and so he would go on to the last of the bench. He calls this reduction of crown influence, and improvement in trade.

P. Ay, he says, that though the church constitution is the best in the world, yet that mankind would rather live well and get money without it, than starve to death for want of employment under it. He would find employment for every living thing, and turn even a bench of bishops into a board of trade.

G. How many inhabitants may I suppose there are in Great Britain?

P. About six millions.

G. And how many employed in directing, inspecting, collecting, spending, and living on the
the

the publick revenues obtained by the industry of the rest?

P. A greater multitude than you would at first glance suppose, the far greater part of which ought to be employed in contributing some way or other to the productions of the state: but these people call themselves the grandeur of the state, and say, they produce the publick good by consuming our property, and making us look great.

G. Is there not a reciprocal dependency between the interest of land and trade?

P. Take the pen, and write as I dictate, and you will soon see what advantages arise from a hundred broad cloths sent to Turkey, and the returns made in raw silk unmanufactured for our own home consumption.

	<i>l.</i>	<i>s.</i>	<i>d.</i>
Suppose a clothier buys at market			
50 packs of wool, picked and			
sorted, at 10 <i>l.</i> per pack	500	0	0
With which wool he makes 100			
broad cloths; and the manu-			
facture thereof in cording, spin-			
ing, weaving, milling, dres-			
sing, &c. as they are usually			
brought to, and sold white at			
Blackwell Hall, will amount to			
about the first cost of the wool	500	0	0
			So

So that these 100 cloths are sold
by the clothier to the merchant
at 10*l.* per cloth

1000 0 0

And the merchant pays for dye-
ing of the said 100 cloths
1-third part in grain colours,
at 7*l.* and two thirds in ordi-
nary colours at 30*s.* per cloth

333 6 8

Also for setting, drawing, pres-
sing, packing, &c. 15*s.* per
cloth

75 0 0

The said 100 cloths will cost the
merchant 14*l.* 1*s.* 8*d.* per cloth
on board, which amounts to

1408 6 8

And, to repay him their cost and
charges here, and their charges
abroad, with a bare allowance
for insurance, and the interest
of his money, they cannot
purchase less, I should think,
than 22 great pounds of sher-
bafsee, or Persia fine raw silk,
for every cloth.

Thus he probably receives, for
the said 100 cloths, 2200
pounds weight of the said raw
silk

Now,

Now, if the half part of this silk is wrought up into plain coloured tabbies, the manufacturers will receive 13s. 7d. per pound

747 1 8

And, if the other half-part is wrought up into rich flowered silks brocaded, the manufacturers will receive 1l. 19s. 9d. per pound

2186 5 0

And the additional charge of dyeing, suppose but of 1-eighth part of the silk, into grain colours, at 9s. per pound

123 15 0

Then the cost and charges of 100 woollen cloths, shipped from London to Turkey, and the manufacture of the raw silk brought from thence in return thereof, must amount to

4465 8 4

The freight of the said 100 cloths, and of the said 2200 pound of raw silk, is computed at

40 12 6

Customs on the said 2200 pound of raw silk at

156 15 0

R

English

English factor's commission abroad
on the sale of the cloth, and
on investing the returns in silk
as aforesaid, computed at

100 0 0

It is here clearly represented to
the view of the reader, that
every 2200 pound weight of
raw silk imported from Tur-
key, and manufactured here
for our consumption, without
paying any thing to the mer-
chant's or mercer's gain, pays
to the landholders, the la-
bourers, and the crown, the
sum of

4762 15 10

If any thing is to be added for the merchant's
and the mercer's gain, and we may depend
upon it they will not be at the trouble of driv-
ing their trades for nothing, we may very well
affirm, that the whole cost of this manufacture
for consumption, cannot be less than 5000*l.* so
that 2200 pounds weight of Turkey raw silk,
manufactured here, pays the sum of 5000*l.* to
the subsistence of our own people.

This account takes the return upon 100
cloths exported to Turkey, and makes them
pay 5000*l.* to the subsistence of our people;
but

but we have heretofore exported annually two hundred times as many cloths for Turkey, and received for about half that quantity of cloth, the same kind of returns in raw silk for our own consumption; and, consequently, our own consumption of Turkey silk paid for the subsistence of our people the sum of 500,000*l. per annum*, besides what is paid by the other half of that trade.

But if the consumption of 5000*l.* value of Turkey silk manufactured pays 500*l.* to the landed interest, for the wool that is exported to Turkey in manufacture, then the annual consumption of 500,000*l.* value of that silk must pay 50,000*l. per annum* to the landed interest.

And yet this is not all that the landed interest might receive annually by means of this half-part of the Turkey trade; the crown and the subjects, who receive nine times as much for customs and labour, pay, perhaps, a ninth part of what they receive to the landed interest for cloaths and provisions, by which means the consumption of Turkey silk manufactured in England, either directly or indirectly, pays a fifth part of its whole value to the landed interest; that is, it pays directly one tenth part of the value of the silk by the woollen manufacture exported, and as much more by enabling the people to purchase necessary cloaths

and provisions, of which as much more is paid to the landed interest.

Now what a condition would the lands be in if it were not for this trade? The poor must come to the parish and the lands for a maintenance. The heavier the rates, the less the tenants can afford to pay the landlord, consequently his land is not worth so much.

G. You mentioned *consumption*, Sir?

P. Consumption is an article of most amazing magnitude, and it is greatest in things of least value, because they lie within every body's reach. It renders the most inconsiderable articles of great consequence first to private œconomy, then to commerce, and last to policy. The materials of one ox set a thousand people to work. The butcher, the tanner, the horner, the tallow-chandler are only heads of several classes of tradesmen and artists, who manufacture the different materials in ten thousand different fashions, and all productive, because cheapness tempts consumption. Of bees London consumes at least one hundred thousand a year, and of calves double the number: of butter sixteen millions of pounds, of cheese twenty one millions, of milk forty millions of pints, and four hundred thousand a year, it is said, the metropolis pays for eggs.

The

G. The more a nation consumes of these articles, the more can the owners of them afford to expend in articles of convenience and elegance.

P. Hence circulation of money, which is that to the prosperity of a nation, which the motion of the blood is to the health of the human body.

G. May not too great rapidity of motion destroy the machine, which motion in some degree is necessary to preserve? Ought not trade to have its natural course?

P. Certainly; and hence the necessity of that encouragement of trade in the governing power in a state on which its prosperity depends. It should neither be neglected, obstructed, and clogged, nor should it be attenuated and diverted, and forced: but it should be eyed, its natural motions and directions humoured and eased, and it should be more cherished for its indirect but real profusion of general profit, than for any immediate farthing advantages to a few individuals, for the sake of a few taxes, to carry on a few measures, of no consequence to the world, and of general loss to the state.

G. What may one suppose the God of nature to have formed Britain for, dominion, or trade?

P. Trade. The whole island is a fine field
that

that wants nothing but cultivating, and if cultivated would overflow with plenty. Holland is a little shop; Britain is a large warehouse, and might manufacture for half the world: but they are industrious while we are idle, and their children make playthings for ours to break. We say the religion of the Dutch is to get money. Do you know what the Dutch say our religion is?

G. No.

P. Bragging and fighting.

G. My uncle says, the twenty-seventh chapter of Ezekiel was written by a Dutchman, or by a man under Dutch prejudices, wailing and lamenting as if all was lost, when nothing was gone except TRADE.

EMIGRATION

MOTTASCOIN

W E D N E S D A Y.

E M I G R A T I O N.

P. **G** E O R G E !

G. Sir !

P. Suppose you were to toss pufs into the fire !

G. Why then she would spring out again.

P. Suppose you should try a less degree of heat, and only scald her with a spoonful out of the spout of the tea-pot ?

G. She would scamper away.

P. I'll tell you the reason ; she is a brute beast, and neither understands Greek nor Latin, nor the admirable frame of our excellent constitution, the best constitution in the world, George !

G. The cat, all cat as she is, understands self-preservation, and though she has taken no degree, she has the philosophy of feeling, and
S knows

knows fire will dissolve the frame of her own constitution.

P. Learnedly spoken! Now turn it into Latin.

G. I comprehend you, Sir. To shift quarters is to *emigrate*; and the natives of one country never emigrate to another freely till they feel themselves hurt.

P. Indeed there is a strong attachment to one's native spot, as if one grew out of the soil.

G. That attachment, like all other natural feelings, is a source of virtue, for it impels men to render their own country happy.

P. Suppose one man, or one class of men, should endeavour to render themselves happy by making others miserable, would it not be more natural for the oppressed to flee than to stay?

G. Undoubtedly. The first attachment is to happiness; attachment to a native spot is a secondary bias for the sake of the first.

P. What if men placed their happiness in wealth?

G. They would flee from a country impoverished by taxation.

P. What if they placed it in honour?

G. They would emigrate to governments where they were admissible to publick offices.

P. So,

P. So, if they placed it in morality, they would flee from states become sinks of profligacy : and if they placed it in the enjoyment of civil and religious liberty, they would emigrate from civil and ecclesiastical tyranny.

G. And who could blame them ?

P. Not the cat, if she could speak ; but neither the Pope nor Plato has ever had the curing of the cat's raw soul !

G. Who could blame the old puritans for fleeing to America from the tyranny of the Bishops and the Stuarts ?

P. They were to blame, however, when they got settled there, for persecuting one another. Much has been said of this, and a little of it in some governments was true. Their governing systems are now formed on a far more liberal plan, and it will be entirely their own faults if they do not frame the largest and the most free empire in the world. Let trade, and not dominion, be their object, and they have duration and glory before them.

G. It is said, numbers will emigrate from Europe after the conclusion of the war.

P. The inducements to do so are very many, and very great : but it will be the fault of the governments they quit, if the natives emigrate.

G. What can prevent emigrations, force ?

P. Perhaps not : but it would not be prudent to try force.

G. By what means then ?

P. By placing the suspected emigrants in a condition of ease. Are they poor ? Employ them. Are they deprived of their birthrights ? Restore them. Are they afraid ? Give them security. Place them at ease, and they will not emigrate. Suppose it were put to your choice : “ You are not happy in your situation, you are excluded you say from schools and offices, and subjected to support a class of men, from whom you derive no benefit, you intend to emigrate with your children and property, to enjoy these advantages in a distant clime. You need not do so, we will bestow on you a waste district here at home, take your children, and cattle, and money, and go settle there and cultivate, and build and order yourselves, only give government security for your quiet, and agree to contribute to support the power that protects you. It will never be in your power to injure us, nor will it ever be our interest to injure you.” I say, suppose such an offer made you, would you choose to accept it ?

G. Who can doubt it ?

P. This would be only realizing a scheme patronized by the late Lord Godolphin for re-peopling the New Forest in Hampshire with the
poor

poor refugees from the Palatinate. The spot was near Lindhurst, in the road from Romsey to Lymington. These people were to be put in possession of 4000 acres, distributed into 20 lots, and were to be exempt from rent and taxes for 20 years, taking care, however, of their own sick and poor, and repairing their own roads, 200*l.* ready money was to be advanced to each lot, with allowances of timber and some other privileges, and at the end of 20 years each lot was to pay 50*l.* yearly to the crown.

P. No damage could have come to the state from this people's ignorance of priesthood and tithes, but great advantages would have arisen from their industry, and a rich repayment of the loan.

P. I have only aimed, George, in all these conversations to give you a few outlines. It remains with you to fill them up: I can have no motives but such as become a man and a christian to have. If you relish these first principles, crude, indigested, and off hand as they may be, you may meet with ample gratifications in many authors from whom I have borrowed. There are, however, a few reflections, which, before we part, I would most earnestly recommend to your attention. I cannot express
them

them so well as these authors have expressed them for us. Here are the books. Oblige me, by reading the marked passages. I am going out, I shall leave you to read to yourself, and to make your own remarks.

“ When our reason first begins to open, we are talked to for six years together about the future in *rus*, and the supine in *um*, without hearing one word of the perfection and usefulness of the arts, or the industry of people that follow employments by which our lives are supported. When our reason begins to acquire more strength, it is put under the direction of masters, who, after a vast deal of preparation, demonstrate that we have a body, and that there are other bodies round us : or spend whole hours, nay, even days, in proving, that of two propositions contradictorily laid down, concerning a possible future which may never happen, the one is determinately true, and the other determinately false, and the like metaphysical jargon.”

“ The learning to distinguish rightly the productions of the globe which we inhabit, the ties whereby all the people living on it are united, and the various labours they are employed in, are things the most neglected. Every one of us has seen the sail of a windmill, and the wheel
of

of a water-mill in action: we know also, that these machines grind corn, and reduce the bark of trees to powder: but we know nothing of the structure of them, and can hardly help confounding a carpenter with an hewer of wood."

"We all carry watches in our pockets, but do we know the mechanism of the fusee round which the chain is wound? Do we understand the use of the spiral line which accompanies the balance? It is just the same as to the most common trades: we know the names of them, and no more. Instead of endeavouring to gain a reasonable knowledge of commerce, manufactures, and mechanics, which are the delight and ornament of that society wherein we are to spend our lives; we pique ourselves on attaining all the niceties of quadrille, or bury ourselves in solitude, upon speculations that have no foundation but in our whimsical imaginations. And, if little judgment is shewn in the choice of our pleasures, a still greater want of it will probably appear in our studies. We run after whatever makes the most noise, and the most sensible people are at last obliged to confess, that they repent more the loss of the time they have employed in studying the subtleties and fooleries of the schools, the arts of pedantry, and the crack-brained altercations of enthusiastic zealots, than
of

of what they have spent in the learning of music, which is sometimes an amusement to them."

"The father or mother of a family, the head of a community, a merchant, a lawyer, a justice of peace, or any of those who have the government either of the actions or consciences of others, may be never the worse for not understanding the monades of Leibnitz, or the disputative bombast of the dogmatists; but there is no one who would not acquit himself better in his employment, was he to acquire a true knowledge of the arts and trades wherein the common people are busied. This kind of philosophy is a thousand times more to be esteemed, than those systems whose inutility is their least fault." *Postlethwayt's Dictionary of Trade and Commerce. Article, Manufacturers.*

"The principal end of a political survey of any country, is, to point out its capacity, under the regulation of a wise policy, to render the inhabitants thereof independent, potent, and happy. In regard to a matter of this importance, more especially in an age so enlightened as this, assertions are not regarded as arguments; and even arguments, however specious or plausible, if unsupported by facts, are not looked upon as conclusive. As far as rhetoric, panegyric, and all the powers of eloquence could reach, BRITAIN, as we have more than

than once had occasion to shew, has been as highly celebrated as any country could be. But how much soever such pieces may please, they seldom carry in them any great degree of information, and will by no means furnish any satisfactory answers to objections. In order to accomplish this, it is requisite to pursue another method, to go to the bottom of things, to enter, and even to enter minutely into particulars, and by thus proceeding step by step, to render whatever is affirmed as clear and as certain as possible. It must be allowed, that this, as well as other countries, hath been subject to very great vicissitudes, and to frequent revolutions, in consequence of which, not only the condition of the inhabitants, but the very face and appearance of the country itself, hath been in different periods greatly altered, which in such a survey ought to be remarked and explained. Many of its natural advantages were at all times too obvious not to be discerned; and yet some of these have never been improved, while others again, passing wholly unnoticed, have been of course totally neglected. But within these two last centuries, since the reformation produced the revival of useful science, the eyes of men have been in a great measure opened; and in consequence of this, much more has been done within that period than in

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many

many ages before. These improvements, how great soever, ought only to be considered as so many laudable models, calculated to excite a still stronger principle of public spirit and emulation; as there still remain various of our native prerogatives unexerted, several great resources unexplored, and not a few means yet untried, by which even greater things than have been yet done, might be still effected in agriculture, manufactures, and commerce, by prosecuting the aptitude this country has for almost every possible species of improvement, and thereby rendering it the noble and respectable center of as extensive, flourishing, and well governed an empire, as any on which, since launched from the hand of the Creator, the sun has ever shone."

As a basis for such a superstructure, we hazarded some political sketches of the great empires in antiquity, and shewed from facts that such stupendous edifices might be erected; and descending from these to countries, which, both in time and situation were less remote, we made it equally evident, that these powers of construction were not confined to any quarter of the globe, or at all restrained to the particular circumstances of soil or climate. But that wisdom and industry, prudence and perseverance, were engines capable of overcoming almost

most any obstacle and removing every defect, and even in some cases of converting apparent defects into real advantages. We also ventured to draw the veil a little, and to render it manifest, that THESE AMAZING EFFECTS WERE NOT PERFORMED BY THOSE MYSTERIOUS AND REFINED ARTS WHICH HAVE USURPED THE NAME OF POLICY IN MODERN AGES; BUT BY SIMPLE AND SOLID MAXIMS, INSPIRED BY GENIUS, APPROVED BY REASON, AND CONFIRMED BY EXPERIENCE. From these sprung a system of rule, founded on a few well-weighed principles, suited to the genius and circumstances of the people, and invariably tending to the public good. Institutions, plain, succinct, and agreeable to the natural notions that all men have of justice; by which a sense of shame was made as much as possible to serve instead of punishment. Idleness was proscribed as the infamous mother of vices; benevolence considered as the visible image of virtue; and industry respected as the parent of independency: which, by affording a comfortable support to private families, maintained order, vigor, harmony, and of course the welfare and stability of the state. In a word, the constitution prescribing their duty to magistrates, the laws controuling the actions of individuals, and the manners diffused from those, either honoured with

with titles, or trusted with power, conveyed a spirit of obedience through all ranks, from a consciousness that, in pursuing the public weal, they took the best and surest method of pursuing their private interests. By the operations of THESE systems, vast countries became full of people, lodged in cities, towns, and villages; while to furnish those with subsistence, their lands of every kind grew by continual cultivation to look like gardens; but when these were overborn by violence, or undermined by corruption, those lands followed the fate of their inhabitants; and as they relapsed into a state of nature, or which is little better, into a state of servitude, those likewise became, in comparison of what they were, so many wildernesses deformed with ruins." *Dr. Cambell's Political Survey of Great Britain.* Vol. I. Sect. IX. page 705.

F I N I S.

